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NOTES
"HONEY, THE JUDGE SAYS WE'RE HISTORY":
ABROGATING THE MARITAL PRIVILEGES VIA
MODERN DOCTRINES OF MARITAL
WORTHINESS
INTRODUCTION
Although criticized and attacked for centuries,I the marital priv-
ileges continue to give married peisons a powerful tool to suppress
evidence at trial. In federal court and in most state courts, a married
person's testimony may be foreclosed at the trial of that person's
spouse through invocation of the marital privileges. 2 Take the hy-
pothetical case ofJim and Susan: Jim, married to Susan, robs a bank
at gunpoint. He then comes home and leaves the gun, which Susan
sees, on his dresser. He also tells her about the robbery. Jim is later
charged with the crime. AtJim's trial, Susan may invoke the adverse
testimonial privilege3 to prevent the prosecution from. questioning
her about the gun, Jim's statements, or anything else related to the
crime. In the alternative, Susan or Jim may invoke the confidential
communications privilege4 to prevent the prosecution from ques-
tioning Susan about Jim's statements to her.
The marital privileges evolved because courts and legislatures,
by implication, determined that protecting the harmony of legal
marital unions was more important than truth-seeking at trial.-
Courts assert that the marital privileges are "necessary to foster
family peace, not only for the benefit of husband, wife, and children,
but for the benefit of the public as well."'6
I See infra note 32.
2 See infra Part I.
3 See infra part I.A.I.
4 See infra part I.A.2.
5 When a court upholds a marital privilege, the implication is that the court values
marital harmony higher than truth-seeking. The Supreme Court made this point ex-
plicit in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980). See also MURL A. ]LARKIN,
FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 4.02[l] (1991).
6 Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958); see also Trammel, 445 U.S. at 48
("[T]he long history of the privilege suggests that it ought not to be casually cast aside.
That the privilege is one affecting marriage, home, and family relationships-already
subject to much erosion in our day-also counsels caution."). For a discussion of pro-
posals for a broader relational privilege extending to nonlegal marriages, see infra notes
40-43 and accompanying text. This Note, however, is limited to an analysis of the mari-
tal privileges as they currently are defined.
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As the Supreme Court established in Pennoyer v. Neff, 7 the states
have exclusive jurisdiction over the prerequisites to a legal mar-
riage." Thus, courts and legislatures applying the marital privileges
must look to state law for a definition of legal marriage.9 However,
modern marital privilege jurisprudence, by ignoring state law defini-
tions of marriage, has narrowed the marital privileges improperly
via doctrines of marital worthiness. These doctrines-the Trammel
rule, the viability doctrine, and the premarriage acts exception10-
pass judgment on the strength of the marital relitionship even when
state domestic relations law makes no such decision. Under these
doctrines, courts and legislatures make assumptions about the
strength of certain marital unions, based either on presumptions or
on ad hoc fact inquiries. These assumptions and inquiries, however,
are not made within the structures of state domestic relations law.
Although no principle of law inherently prevents a state legisla-
ture from employing two definitions of marriage-one for domestic
relations purposes and one for the marital privileges-such a course
of action is undesirable. Decisions regarding marital status are best
left to those with the expertise and experience necessary to make
informed and carefully considered decisions regarding marriage--
legislative committees charged with drafting domestic relations law
or state family courts.
7 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
8 "The State ... has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the
marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created .. " Id. at 734-35; accord
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975).
9 The privileges in state court are determined by either judicial or legislative deci-
sion. See infra note 14. In federal court, the Federal Rules of Evidence govern the
court's application of the privileges. In most situations, federal courts look to the body
of federal common law to determine privileges, see FED. R. EVID. 501, but in civil actions
and proceedings in "which state law supplies the rule of decision" (generally diversity
actions), privilege is determined according to state law. Id.
The Federal Rules of Evidence, as originally proposed to Congress by the Supreme
Court, contained nine separate privileges, including the husband-wife privilege (PRO-
POSED FED. R. EvID. 505). The proposals drew fierce opposition from those who saw the
proposed privileges as a usurpation of the states' rights to determine privilege law in
diversity actions and feared a resulting lack of uniformity of decision between federal
and state courts hearing similar actions in the same state. Congress opted not to adopt
any of the proposed privilege rules and instead enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 501,
which was lifted verbatim from the prior Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.
The never-enacted Proposed Rule 505, addressing the husband-wife privilege, was
also criticized by commentators because it included only an adverse testimonial privi-
lege, and not a confidential communications privilege. See Mark Reutlinger, Policy, Thi-
vacy, and Prerogatives: A Critical Examination of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence as They
Affect Marital Privilege, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1353 (1973). Most criticism of the marital privi-
leges has been directed at the ATP, see infra note 32, which makes it easy to see why a
rule maintaining that privilege, but denying the more widely accepted CCP, would fall
under attack.
10 For a discussion of the three doctrines, see infra part III.
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MARITAL PRIVILEGES
The privileges were created to protect legal marriages because
of the belief that such marriages possess unique qualities beneficial
to society."I When a court or legislature denies the privileges to a
legal marriage, that denial in effect says that a legal marriage lacks
unique qualities and does not deserve protection in all cases. This
contradicts the marital privileges' purpose.
Decisions by federal courts regarding a marriage's worthiness
or status are especially undesirable. Under Pennoyer, federal courts
must follow state domestic relations law. Yet in marital privilege
jurisprudence, federal courts regularly ignore Pennoyer's admonition
that the federal courts have no jurisdiction over the definition of
marriage.' 2 Further, federal courts lack expertise in domestic rela-
tions law, making their decisions uninformed and problematic.
This Note assumes the existence of the privileges as currently
mandated by the Supreme Court13 and most state legislatures. 4 . It
is beyond the scope of this Note to argue for or against the existence
of the marital privileges in light of the numerous philosophical, so-
cial, and cultural concerns at stake. Instead, this Note examines the
privileges within this construct and argues that courts and legisla-
tures should cease making determinations of marital worthiness
without regard for domestic relations law or for the purpose of the
privileges.
This Note first provides background on the marital privileges
and how courts and legislatures properly limit the privileges to
those legally married under state domestic relations law. The Note
then examines, in depth, how courts and legislatures have eroded
the marital privileges through the three doctrines of marital worthi-
ness: the Trammel rule, the marital viability doctrine, and the
premarriage acts exception.
11 See supra note 6.
12 See supra note 8.
13 Trammel, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980) (upholding marital privilege as furthering the
important public interest in marital harmony).
14 For a list of marital privilege statutes in the states, see Trammel, 445 U.S. at 48 n.9
(1980). For full texts of some of those statutes, see 3 GREGORY P.JOSEPH & STEPHEN A.
SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES (1987 State Rules
App. & Supp. 1990).
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I
BACKGROUND
A. Modern Marital Evidentiary Privileges: Scope and
Application
Two separate marital privileges currently exist: the adverse tes-
timonial privilege and the confidential communications privilege. 15
Both privileges seek to protect some aspect of the marital relation-
ship at the expense of truth-seeking at trial.
1. Adverse Testimonial Privilege
The adverse testimonial privilege (ATP) generally applies only
in criminal actions.16 In its simplest form, the ATP bars testimony
by a witness against the defendant when the witness and the defen-
dant are married at the time of trial; 17 however, prior to a grant of
privilege by a court, the person asserting the ATP m8 must prove the
15 The adverse testimonial privilege is also known as the antimarital facts privilege.
For a discussion of the distinctions between the two privileges, see JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, 2 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE
FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND FOR STATE COURTS 505-6 (1991).
16 See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 15, at 505-13.
17 Originally, under the ATP, in federal court a spouse could not give testimony for
or against the other spouse. This rule was an outgrowth of the common-law rules of
coverture, under which parties to lawsuits were incompetent to testify due to their inter-
est in the proceedings. Thus, a party's spouse, who was legally the same entity and the
actual party were disqualified. Eventually the rules of coverture changed and spouses
became separate legal entities, but witness-spouses were still deemed incompetent to
testify because of their interest as spouses. Hence, disqualification of spousal testimony
was not spoken of as a privilege, but as a corollary to the disqualification of a party-in-
interest's testimony. Thus, a spouse could not testify for or against the other spouse. In
short, the early rules of incompetence were based on "a general unwillingness to use
testimony of witnesses tempted by strong self-interest to testify falsely." Hawkins v.
United States, 358 U.S. 74, 75 (1958).
Spousal incompetency survived until fairly recently. See Funk v. United States, 290
U.S. at 371 (1933) (removing the bar of incompetence from spousal testimony in kederal
court). But incompetency has been replaced with a new rule and rationale. Today,
under federal common law and under most state law, spouses of parties to lawsuits, like
the parties themselves, are competent to testify, but an assertion of the ATP may pre-
vent a witness-spouse from testifying. While the ATP suppresses testimony at trial, the
parties are competent to testify and may waive the privilege. See generally Barbara G.
Glenn, Note, The Deconstruction of the Marital Privilege, 12 PEPP. L. REV. 723 (1985) (argu-
ing that the privileges now rest on protection of the marriage instead of divergent no-
tions such as competence and voluntariness of testimony). Additionally, today the
privilege, unlike the former rule of incompetence, is only used to prevent adverse testi-
mony. See Funk, 290 U.S. at 371 (ending the rule of spousal incompetence by allowing
witnesses to testify favorably for their spouses). However, some states still grant the
privilege to favorable as well as adverse testimony. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE
§ 5.60.060 (Supp. 1991) ("A husband shall not be examined for or against his wife...
nor a wife for or against her husband .... ").
18 In some state courts, the defendant-spouse, the witness-spouse, or both may as-
sert the ATP. In federal court, only the witness-spouse may assert the ATP. See Trammel,
445 U.S. 40
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existence of a legal marriage.' 9 Until the advent of the premarriage
acts exception, 20 the ATP covered testimony relating to events
before or after the marriage.
The most commonly offered rationale for the ATP is preserva-
tion of marital harmony by suppressing testimony that would dis-
rupt marital peace. 21 A trial involving even one spouse is deemed to
place extreme strains on the marriage. Thus, permitting one spouse
to testify against the other is disfavored because this may damage
the relationship. Another rationale for the ATP asserts that courts
should not provide forums for the display of one spouse testifying
against the other, a display which has been labelled a sight of "natu-
ral repugnance. 22
In 1980, Trammel v. United States2s drastically altered the ATP in
federal criminal proceedings. After Trammel, only witness-spouses
may raise the privilege to prevent their examination on the witness
stand. Thus, when the witness-spouse is willing to testify volunta-
rily, 24 the defendant-spouse cannot foreclose adverse testimony.
19 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 640 F.Supp. 988, 989 (E.D. Mich. 1986). In
some courts, the witness-spouse may be called to the stand but then excused upon asser-
tion of the privilege. Other courts, however, hold it error even to put the witness-
spouse on the stand, because such action brings the privilege to the fact-finder's atten-
tion and raises an inference that the party-spouse has something damaging to hide. See
San Fratello v. United States, 340 F.2d 560, 566 (5th Cir.) (reversing the verdict against
defendant because the government had called defendant's wife to the stand knowing
that she would raise the marital privilege), reh 'g denied, 343 F.2d 711 (1965); accord State
v. McGinty, 126 P.2d 1086 (Wash. 1942).
20 See infra part III.C.
21 Justice Black explained the justifications for the A-T in Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 74.
Justice Black believed that the privilege fosters family peace by preventing testimony
that could promote marital dissension. He asserted that the privilege also serves the
public, because the public has an interest in promoting stable domestic relations:
The basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against husband or hus-
band against wife in a trial where life or liberty is at stake was a belief that
such a policy was necessary to foster family peace, not only for the benefit
of husband, wife and children, but for the benefit of the public as well.
Such a belief has never been unreasonable and is not now.
Id. at 77. Although Trammel overruled Hawkins' basic holding that either the witness- or
party-spouse can raise the AT?, Trammel left untouched Hawkins' affirmation of the valid-
ity of marital privilege. See infra part III.A.
22 See 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2228, at 217 (John T. McNaughton rev. 1961).
"[A] natural and strong repugnance was felt.., to condemning a man by admitting to
the witness stand against him those who lived under his roof, shared the secrets of his
domestic life, depended on him for sustenance and were almost numbered among his
chattels." Id § 2227, at 212.
Professor Wigmore, though calling this rationale "plausible" and "at least founded
on a fact," believed that it, like the marital harmony rationale, .cannot withstand criti-
cism. Id at 217.
23 445 U.S. 40 (1980). For a discussion of Trammel, see infra notes 64-81 and ac-
companying text.
24 See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53.
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2. Confidential Communications Privilege
The confidential communications privilege (CCP) in its sim-
plest form prevents a spouse from testifying as to any information
(adverse or favorable) communicated confidentially (verbally or
otherwise)25 to the other spouse.26 The CCP protects the marital
relationship by assuring married persons full confidentiality for
communications with their spouses. 2 7 The privilege protects confi-
dential communications because of their nexus with the marital rela-
tionship, which the CCP, like the ATP, values at a higher level than
truth-seeking in court.28 However, unlike the ATP, the witness-
spouse and the party-spouse do not have to be married at the time
of trial to raise the CCP; they simply must have been married at the
time of the communication. Thus, the CCP applies at trial even if
the witness-spouse and party-spouse are no longer married.29 The
CCP is usually available in both criminal and civil proceedings.30
25 Courts do not completely agree on the definition of "confidentially." Generally,
the communication must occur within the marital relationship (not in a business con-
text) and cannot be revealed to third parties. See United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724
(9th Cir. 1990). Some state marital privilege statutes extend the communications privi-
lege beyond verbal communications to acts that are not necessarily communicative but
which are performed in private and only witnessed by the other spouse. See, e.g., OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2945A2 (Anderson 1981) ("Husband or wife shall not testify con-
cerning a communication made by one to the other, or act done by either in the pres-
ence of the other, during coverture .... "); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-201 (1980)
("[N]either husband nor wife shall testify as to any matter that occurred between them
by virtue of or in consequence of the marital relationship .... ).
26 Perhaps because a communications privilege is often unnecessary when a rule of
competence or the ATP will deny the testimony anyway, the CCP took longer to come
into its own, separate legal existence. See Shenton v. Tyler, 1 Ch. 620 (Ch. 1939) (de-
claring that no such privilege as the CCP existed at common law); Stapleton v. Crofts,
118 Eng. Rep. 137, 140 (1852) (calling protection of conjugal confidences "not yet
established" as a rule). In England, the Evidence Amendment Act § 3 (1853) ,finally
recognized the CCP as a legal concept. One English court has declared the communica-
tions privilege in that country to be purely statutory. See Shenton, 1 Ch. 620.
27 "There is no place like a bed for confidential disclosures between friends. Man
and wife, they say, there open the very bottom of their souls to each other;, and some old
couples often lie and chat over old times till nearly morning." United States v. Byrd,
750 F.2d 585, 593 n.5 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting conversation between Ishmael and Quee-
queg, in HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK 54 (Norton critical ed. 1967)).
28 The CCP's rationale rests on three precepts: (1) confidential communications are
essential to the marital relationship; (2) the marital relationship is a proper area for the
law to protect; and (3) the injury to the relationship following disclosure of a confiden-
tial communication outweighs the benefit to thejudicial system in terms of truth-seeking
that would follow disclosure. See WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 2332, at 642.
29 See SCOTT N. STONE & RONALD S. LIEBm A, TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES, § 5.09
(1983).
30 See LARKIN, supra note 5, § 4.03[3]. In most states, however, the CCP does not
apply to civil actions by one spouse against the other or to divorce actions. See STONE &
LIEBMAN, supra note 29, § 5.15, at 357.
848
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3. Interconnection of the Two Privileges
Although the two privileges differ in application, both promote
some aspect of the marital relationship. The CCP promotes the
marital relationship at the time of communication and the ATP pro-
tects the marital relation at the time of trial.3 ' Both require a deter-
mination of the marital status of the party and witness.
3 2
31 The [ATP] looks forward with reference to the particular marriage at
hand: the privilege is meant to protect against the impact of the testi-
mony on the marriage. The [CGP] in a sense, is broader and more ab-.
stract: it exists to insure that spouses generally, prior to any involvement
in criminal activity or a trial, feel free to communicate their deepest feel-
ings to each other without fear of eventual exposure in a court of law.
Byrd, 750 F.2d at 590.
32 Between the two marital privileges, the ATP has received the majority of com-
mentators' and courts' criticisms, although the CCP is not without its detractors. Jeremy
Bentham, writing in 1827, argued that the ATP unduly burdens the pursuit of truth and
grants license to the evil-doer to recruit his spouse into the web of crime: "[The marital
privilege] secures, to every man, one safe and unquestionable and ever ready accomplice
for every imaginable crime." 5JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OFJUDICIAL EVIDENCE 338
(1827).
Professor Wigmore, quoting Bentham and others, also voiced strong opposition to
the ATP. In his view, because the rule has existed so long, reasons for it have simply
been invented ex post facto. WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 2228, at 213. Wigmore summa-
rized his view on the ATP by stating, "This privilege has no longer adequate reason for
retention.... [It] is the merest anachronism in legal theory and an indefensible obstruc-
tion to truth in practice." Il at 221.
Critics of the ATP have also opposed its fundamental tenet that marital harmony is
more important than truth-seeking. For example, Wigmore asked why, when Doe's wife
witnesses Doe commit a wrong against Roe, the judicial system favors Doe's own marital
interests over Roe's interests in determining whether "justice shall have its course
against him." Id at 217.
In addition, critics have questioned whether the privilege actually promotes marital
harmony, because the accuracy of this assumption has never been explained logically or
empirically. See id. at 216. Furthermore, critics mock the "natural repugnance" ration-
ale (the spectacle of spouses testifying against one another in court) as a sentiment that
has no place in a court of law. See id at 217; see also UNIF. R. EID. § 23(2) cmt. (1953)
(calling the ATP a "sentimental relic").
One critic has even gone so far as to call for the end of the ATP because the numer-
ous exceptions to the rule, formed out of a judicial contempt for it, are inconsistent and
thus undermine its rationale. See David Medine, The Adverse Testimonial Privilege: Time to
Dispose of a "Sentimental Relic," 67 OR. L. REv. 519 (1988). '
The CCP has fared better in the eyes of courts and commentators, perhaps because
it resembles similar communications privileges such as the physician-patient privilege
and the attorney-client privilege. Professor Wigmore, while vehemently denouncing the
ATP, supported the CCP. Wigmore's only concern with the CCP was that the truth of
its last tenet, see supra note 28 (discussing the three tenets of the CCP), cannot be known.
Wigmore fully accepted the other tenets. See WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 2332, at 642.
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TRADITIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE MARITAL PRIVILEGES
THROUGH DEFINITIONS OF LEGAL MARRIAGE
Because both marital privileges are contrary to truth-seeking,
all jurisdictions have held that courts must construe them nar-
rowly.33 Because the privileges by definition protect marital rela-
tionships, courts and legislatures restrict the privileges to those who
are legally married, either at the time of trial (ATP) or at the time of
communication (CCP). Thus, when determining whether a valid
marriage exists at the operative moment, courts uniformly deny the
marital privileges to spouses who previously divorced or whose mar-
riage was annulled under appropriate state domestic relations law.3 4
However, the CCP continues after divorce, providing the communi-
cation was made during marriage.3 5 Similarly, death of one of the
spouses can terminate the ATP but not the CCP. If one of the
spouses has died, then by definition no marriage exists upon which
to raise the ATP.36 The CCP, however, protects communications
made by a spouse who dies after the communication is made.3 7 In
addition to death and divorce, courts also accept other limits on the
marital privileges. These limits' relate to unmarried couples, com-
mon-law marriages, and sham marriages.
A. Engagement, Putative Spouses, and Unmarried Cohabitants
Couples not complying with the formal requirements of state
marital procedures who have tried to assert the marital privileges
have generally failed. Courts will not grant the marital privileges to
33 One state court has held that limitations on the privilege need only be justified
by a rational relationship to a legitimate state goal, since the privileges exist by virtue of
legislative fiat, not constitutional right. State v. Watkins, 614 P.2d 835, 840 (Ariz. 1980).
34 See United States v. Termini, 267 F.2d 18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 822
(1959); Damrell v. State, 352 N.E.2d 855 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
A pending appeal from a divorce decree has no effect on the denial of the privilege.
See United States v. Fisher, 518 F.2d 836 (2d Cir.) (holding that a decree of divorce is a
final decree which fully and completely dissolves the marriage, despite the pendency of
an appeal, under Nevada domestic relations law), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975).
35 See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954); Freeman v. State, 786 S.W.2d 56
(Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
36 United States v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1978).
37 The New York Court of Appeals has held that the CCP protected a suicide note
received by the decedent's spouse after the victim's death, because the communication
was made during marriage. See In re Vanderbilt (Rosner-Hickey), 439 N.E.2d 378 (N.Y.
1982).
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those couples engaged to be married.38 Similarly, courts have unan-
imously rejected claims of marital privilege by putative spouses.3 9
Although persuasive arguments have been made for extending
testimonial privileges beyond the confines of the marital relation-
ship to unmarried cohabitants, 40 such arguments fall beyond the
scope of the marital privileges, which are addressed to marital rela-
tionships only.4 1 Thus, federal courts, following Federal Rule of Ev-
idence 501's mandate that marital privileges should be construed
narrowly, have refused to extend the marital privileges to unmarried
38 See, e.g., People v. Stanford, 242 N.W.2d 56 (Mich. App. 1976) (denying the ATP
to an engaged couple). For a discussion of the required marital relationship, see STONE
& LIEBMAN, supra note 29, at § 5.03.
39 See People v. Dake, 8 Cal. Rptr. 283 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960); see also United States v.
Neeley, 475 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1973) (denying the CCP to defendant's fifth and sixth
wives when defendant was still legally married to third wife); United States v. McElrath,
377 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1967) (denying marital privilege to an otherwise valid common-
law marriage when the wife was still legally married to a previous husband); People v.
Mabry, 455 P.2d 759 (Cal. 1969) (denying privilege when marriage to defendant was
void because witness's divorce from previous marriage was not yet final), cert. denied 406
U.S. 972 (1972).
40 See, e.g., Deborah A. Ausburn, Note, Circling the Wagons: Informational Privacy and
Family Testimonial Privileges, 20 GA. L. REV. 173 (1985) (calling for a privilege that extends
to the entire nuclear family); Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARv.
L. REV. 1450, 1588-92 (1985) (proposing a broader privilege based on intimacy of rela-
tionships to include unmarried cohabitants, parent-child relationships, homosexual lov-
ers, and intimate friends) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
Numerous proposals have suggested extension of the testimonial privileges, at least
to parent-child relationships, under a broader relational privilege. See, e.g., J. Tyson
Covey, Note, Making Form Follow Function: Considerations in Creating and Applying a Statutory
Parent-Child Privilege, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 879, 913; Robert L. Maxwell, Comment, The
Parent-Child Privilege, 1984 B.Y.U. L. REV. 599 (1984); Developments in the Law, supra, at
1575-77. A few states and two federal courts currently provide for a parent-child privi-
lege. See IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (1990); MINN STAT § 595.02(i) (1988); In re Agosto,
553 F. Supp. 1298, 1325 (D. Nev. 1983) (granting privilege to son not to testify against
his father); In re Greenberg, 11 FED. R. EvID. SERV. (Callaghan) 579, 582-84 (D. Conn.
1982) (allowing mother to refuse to testify against daughter based on religious
grounds); People v. Fitzgerald, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Westchester Cty. Ct. 1979) (basing
the parent-child privilege on a constitutional right of privacy).
41 For a discussion of issues involved in extending a privilege to unmarried cohabi-
tants, see Teri S. O'Brien, Comment, The Husband-Wife Evidentiary Privileges: Is Marriage
Really Necessary?, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 411 (concluding that marital privileges should not
extend to unmarried cohabitants, because doing so would not serve the policy behind
the privileges and would run counter to truth-seeking).
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cohabitants. 42 Similarly, state courts have refused to grant the privi-
leges to unmarried cohabitants. 43
42 In In re Grand Jury Proceedings Witness Ms. X, 562 F. Supp. 486 (N.D. Cal.
1983), the court held that although the policy of promoting marital accord was increas-
ingly recognized in nonmarital settings, it did not outweigh the public's right to evi-
dence in criminal investigations. Id. at 488. Ms. X received a grand jury subpoena to
testify regarding her domestic partner, Mr. Y, with whom she had lived for six and a half
years and with whom she had two children. The court acknowledged that courts must
afford greater recognition to nonformalized relationships but-found that the grand jury
arena was not the proper place to recognize such a change in the law. Id. at 487. The
court concluded: "Courts are careful to construe recognized privileges narrowly and to
adopt new privileges with extreme caution." Id.
43 Unmarried cohabitants seeking to enjoy the protection of marital privileges have
asked courts to extend the reasoning of Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976)
(holding that an unmarried cohabitant of actor Lee Marvin could state a claim for distri-
bution of his property based on express or implied contract theory). Such efforts have
failed. In People v. Delph, 156 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979), a California appel-
late court denied a marital privilege and distinguished Marvin by pointing out that Mar-
vin did not resurrect the doctrine of common-law marriage in California, but rather
limited its holding to property rights based on contract law and equitable interests. Id.
at 425; accord Witness Ms. X, 562 F. Supp. at 487-88 (limiting its reading of Marvin to the
area of property rights upon dissolution of marriage). The Delph court added that Mar-
vin did not "signal [ I a general elevation of meretricious relationships themselves to the
level of marriages for any and all purposes." 156 Cal. Rptr. at 425. Ultimately, said the
court, it is up to the legislature to decide whether such relationships, because of their
commonness in society, deserve statutory protection. In Delph, the prosecution called
Ms. James, who had lived with Delph for four years and had a child by him, to testify
whether she had seen Delph make, or was told that he made, bomb threats. Delph as-
serted the ATP and the CCP. The court denied the privileges and held that couples
living together with all the trappings of marriage but without a formal ceremony could
not enjoy the protections of the marital privileges. Id. at 425.
Efforts by unmarried cohabitants to claim the marital privileges under an equal pro-
tection theory have failed as well. In State v. Watkins, 614 P.2d 835 (Ariz. 1980), defen-
dant Watkins claimed that Arizona's marital privilege statute, ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-4062 (1989), which applied only to ceremonially married individuals, violated the
equal protection rights of nonmarried individuals in de facto marriages. After Watkins
and an individual namedLaw had a fight, Watkins told his live-in companion, Pritchard,
that he would kill Law. Later, Watkins fought with Pritchard and severely beat her, after
which he killed Law. At Watkin's trial for murder and aggravated assault, Pritcharg testi-
fied against him. The couple did not attempt to claim that they had a common-law mar-
riage, because they did not consider themselves married or hold themselves out as
married. However, the couple believed that they had a de facto marriage because of
their representations that they lived together, had sexual relations, and pooled living
expenses. The Watkins court upheld the statute as rationally related to legitimate state
interests in (1) limiting the application of the privileges to those relationships worthy of
protection and (2) orderly administration of law by preventing the extension of the privi-
leges to less permanent relationships, which would necessitate factual inquiries to distin-
guish de facto marriages from casual alliances. 614 P. 2d at 840. The court stated that
acceptance of the doctrine of de facto marriages would require a case-by-case determi-
nation based on such intangible factors as intimacy, commitment, and stability. Ulti-
mately, however, the Watkins court, like the Delph court, held that it is up to the
legislature to decide whether de facto marriages deserve statutory protection. Id. The
court noted that disparity of treatment between married couples and unmarried couples
does not burden a constitutional right, because extension of the ATP to de facto mar-
riages is unrelated to the constitutional requirement of a fair trial. Thus, the state did
not have to present a compelling interest.
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B. Common-Law Marriages
The marital privileges apply to common-law marriages, but
only if such a marriage is recognized by the state of residence" and
validly established under state law.45 In the leading case, United
States v. Lustig,46 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit assumed
the existence of a common-law marriage under traditional common-
law marriage principles because the defendant and his partner lived
together for seven years, had two children together, and held them-
selves out as husband and wife. The court, however, denied the
couple both of the marital privileges because each privilege depends
on the existence of a legal marriage under state law, and Alaska did
not recognize common-law marriages.47
C. Sham Marriages
Sham marriages-those entered into fraudulently-find" their
way into marital privilege jurisprudence in one of two ways. First,
courts and legislatures may deny the marital privileges to those mar-
riages entered into fraudulently for a purpose other than fraud
upon the court, such as to defraud the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service.48 Second, courts and legislatures may deny the marital
44 United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. dnied, 434 U.S. 1045
(1978).
45 Schirato v. State, 391 S.E.2d 116 (Ga. 1990) (denying the ATP to witness who
could not prove common-law marriage to defendant).
46 555 F.2d 737. In his trial for possession, distribution, and conspiracy to dis-
tribute cocaine, Lustig testified that he did not distribute cocaine to codefendant Peder-
son. In rebuttal, the prosecution called Newton, Lustig's common-law wife (under
traditional common-law principles) of seven years, to testify that she knew that Lustig
and Pederson had agreed to distribute cocaine.
47 Id. at 747-48; accord United States v. White, 545 F.2d 1129, 1130 (8th Cir. 1976)
(denying marital privilege because Arkansas did not recognize common-law marriage);
People v. Torres, 394 N.Y.S.2d 546 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (denying the CCP to a couple
who considered themselves married because they had a child and lived together, the
court pointed out that neither of the couple's past residences (New York or Puerto Rico)
recognized common-law marriages).
Lustig also rejected the couple's claim to the CCP by holding that the witness's ob-
servations of Lustig's narcotics transactions did not concern communications nor were
the communications confidential, because third parties were present. 666 F.2d at 748.
48 "In a sham, phony, empty ceremony.., the reason for the rule disqualifying a
spouse from giving testimony disappears, and with it the rule." Lutwak v. United
States, 344 U.S. 604, 615 (denying the ATP to defendant, a World War II veteran, who
married his wife for the sole purpose of bringing her into the United States under the
Alien War Brides Act which was in direct violation of 8 U.S.C. § 180(a) (1988) and 18
U.S.C. § 1546 (1984)), reh'g denied, 345 U.S. 919 (1953). However, the dissent in Lutwak
strongly criticized the rule because it allows the trial court to use the very testimony-
the admissibility ofwhich is in question-to determine whether a sham took place: "The
Court's position seems to be that privileged testimony may be received to destroy its
own privilege. We think this is not allowable, for the same reason that one cannot lift
himself by his own bootstraps." Id. at 622 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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privileges to those marriages entered into as a fraud on the court,
for example, when the couple marries solely for the purpose of rais-
ing marital privilege.49
When raising the sham-marriage doctrine to object to the pre-
clusion of spousal testimony, the opponent of the privilege offers
evidence of fraud in an in camera proceeding or pretrial hearing.50
Factors indicating a sham include evidence that the couple never
consummated the marriage,51 that the couple does not live together
and has no plans to do so, 52 or that one spouse threatened the other
into marriage. 5
3
Courts disagree over whether suspicious timing of a marriage
proves fraud. Older cases traditionally held that suspicious timing
cannot alone create an inference of fraud.54 While some recent
cases continue to hold that suspicious timing can be a factor in a
finding of fraud but cannot, by itself, create an inference of fraud, 55
the Alaska Supreme Court in 1981 denied the ATP despite the ab-
sence of an explicit sham-marriage finding. 56 The court pointed to
49 See United States v. Saniti, 604 F.2d 603 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 969
(1979).
50 See id. (holding that the trial court's determination, as a finding of fact upon an
evidentiary hearing that the marriage ceremony was entered into solely for the purpose
of invoking the marital privilege and thus not in good faith, will not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous). But see Ricarte v. State, 717 S.W.2d 488 (Ark. 1986) (reversing the
trialjudge's denial of the adverse testimonial privilege, when the trial judge determined
that the marriage, entered into three days before trial, should not create a privilege).
51 See Lutwak, 344 U.S. at 613.
52 See id. at 611; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 777 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1985).
53 See United States v. Apodaca, 522 F.2d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1975) (denying the
ATP to defendant who threatened to kill the witness if she testified against him; trial
court conditioned defendant's bail on not contacting the witness, yet the defendant con-
tacted the witness and then married her three days before trial); see also United States v.
Mathis, 559 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting that when defendant promised former wife
$25,000 and custody of their child if she would remarry him, and when she lIter re-
ceived an anonymous phone call threatening to kill her baby, the evidence indicated a
fraud on the court).
54 See San Fratello v. United States, 340 F.2d 560, 566, reh 'g denied, 343 F.2d 711
(5th Cir. 1965) (fact that defendant married the witness after commission of the offense
and a short time before trial, even if for the possible reason of suppressing testimony,
did not negate marital privilege) (dicta). See also State v. Chrismore, 274 N.W. 3 (Iowa
1937) (holding that when the proponent proves a legal marriage the motive for entering
it is irrelevant); Moore v. State, 75 S.W. 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 1903) (believing itself
constrained by statute, the court granted the privilege despite evidence that the mar-
riage was entered into one day prior to trial solely to suppress testimony).
55 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 777 F.2d at 508 (suspicious timing of marriage five
days before trial did not negate marital privilege, when other evidence, including con-
cessions by the government that the couple lived together before and after marriage and
married as a natural progression of their love and affection for each other, indicated that
the marriage was entered into in good faith).
56 Osborne v. State, 623 P.2d 784 (Alaska 1981).
854
1992] MARITAL PRIVILEGES 855
the suspicious timing of the marriage and the defendant's strong
motive to exclude the testimony.
5 7
The sham-marriages doctrine creates the only context in which
a court may deny marital privileges to otherwise legally married
spouses. A court does not contradict state domestic relations law
when it denies the marital privileges to sham marriages, because
under state domestic relations law a sham marriage is invalid. Just
as courts may deny the privileges of contract to parties who fraudu-
lently enter into an agreement, so too may courts deny the marital
privileges to those who fraudulently enter into marriage. Further,
protection of fraudulent marriages does not square with the pur-
poses of the privileges: to protect marital harmony and communica-
tions in marriages entered into for the reasons contemplated in
state marriage statutes.58 -
III
IMPROPER LIMITATIONS ON MARITAL PRIVILEGES THROUGH
PRESUMPTIONS AND DOCTRINES OF WORTHINESS
In recent years, courts and legislatures have narrowed the mari-
tal privileges after making inferences based on certain fact patterns,
even though those inferences contradict the privileges' purposes.
These inferences fall into one of two categories: inferences that the
marriage is unworthy of the privilege, and inferences that a mar-
riage is invalid even when the marriage complies with all the formal-
ities of the state's marriage statute. The first category encompasses
the Trammel rule and the marital viability doctrine. The second cate-
gory covers the premarriage acts exception.
A. Trammel Rule
In some respects, the Trammel59 rule-that only the witness-
spouse can raise the ATP in a federal criminal trial-creates a nar-
row departure from precedent because it only addresses the ATP
57 Id. Defendant's attorney organized a marriage ceremony for the defendant and
the principal witness against the defendant fifteen minutes prior to a hearing on the
state's motion to enjoin the issuance of a marriage license. The court concluded: "[To
allow the privilege here would] exalt[ ] form over substance, and ( I asks us to blind
ourselves to the probable underlying motivation for the marriage. In these circum-
stances no affirmative proof of fraud needs to be adduced." Id. at 787.
58 One commentator points out that in a fraudulent marriage, marital harmony
likely does not exist. See Patricia Boies, The Husband-Wife Privilege in Federal Courts, 59
B.U. L. REv. 894, 905-07 (1979).
59 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980). Otis and Elizabeth Trammel were
involved in a heroin importing operation. On a stopover in Hawaii, Elizabeth Trammel
was arrested by Drug Enforcement Agents and asked to testify against Otis Trammel.
She agreed. Id. at 42.
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and its application in federal criminal proceedings. However, Tram-
mel's implications reach more broadly.
1. Pre-Trammel Background
Prior to 1980, either the witness-spouse or the defendant-
spouse could raise the ATP in federal criminal proceedings. In the
1958 case of Hawkins v. United States,60 the Supreme Court expressly
upheld the practice of allowing the defendant-spouse to prevent the
witness-spouse from testifying when the witness-spouse wished to
testify. Rejecting the federal government's argument that a witness-
spouse's willingness to testify against the other spouse indicates that
the marriage is in such a state of disrepair that the ATP cannot ad-
vance marital harmony, the Court found that adverse testimony,
whether compelled or voluntary, would disturb marital harmony.6 1
The Court stated that, in reality, voluntary testimony by one spouse
would likely cause more bitterness on the part of the other spouse.62
According to Justice Black's opinion, marriages could weather
"flare-ups in which one spouse wants to hurt the other," but no
marriage could endure the "unforgivable" act of one spouse testify-
ing against the other.63
2. Trammel
Twenty-two years after Hawkins, the Court re-examined this is-
sue in Trammel v. United States.64 Voicing strong disapproval of the
ATP in general,65 the Court upheld the existence of the privilege
but modified it as the government had urged in both Hawkins and
Trammel.66 According to the Court, when a spouse wishes to testify
60 358 U.S. 74 (1958). Hawkins was prosecuted for interstate transportation of a
girl for immoral purposes, after he drove a young woman from Arkansas to Oklahoma to
engage in prostitution. The prosecution offered the testimony of Hawkins's wife to con-
tradict Hawkins's claim that prostitution was not the motivation.
61 Id. at 77.
62 Id.
63 See id. at 77-78:
[N]ot all marital flare-ups in which one spouse wants to hurt the other are
permanent. The widespread success achieved by courts throughout the
country in conciliating family differences is a real indication that some
apparently broken homes can be saved provided no unforgivable act is
done by either party. Adverse testimony given in criminal proceedings
would, we think, be likely to destroy almost any marriage.
64 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
65 Id. at 48 ("[T]he law on occasion adheres to doctrinal concepts long after the
reasons which gave them birth have disappeared and after experience suggests the need
for change.").
66 In explaining its justification for reversing its own relatively recent decision in
Hawkins, the Court pointed to the need to construe the marital privileges narrowly be-
cause they undermine truth-seeking. The Court also asserted that a court-made rule
may be altered when it no longer serves its purpose: "'When precedent and precedent
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voluntarily, the marriage is certainly in a state of disrepair with little
marital harmony to preserve. 67 As such, allowing the privilege to
block testimony would frustrate justice more than it would foster
family peace.68 The Court believed that its modified privilege would
further the important public interest in marital harmony without
burdening legitimate law enforcement needs.69 Thus, in federal
criminal proceedings, the ATP is currently available only to the
witness-spouse, who may neither be compelled to testify by the gov-
ernment nor foreclosed from testifying by the defendant-spouse. 70
Thus, the Trammel modification protects only those marriages that
the witness-spouse seeks to protect.
The Court went further, asserting that denying the witness-
spouse the opportunity to testify could itself lead to marital discord
and resentment because application of the old privilege would pre-
vent the witness-spouse from making a deal with the government in
cases in which the spouse is a codefendant; thus the defendant-
spouse could escape justice while the witness-spouse suffered.7 1
The Court also implied that the defendant-spouse invokes the
privilege to save him or herself, and not to save the marriage. Ac-
cording to the Court, between the defendant- and the witness-
spouse, the witness-spouse would more likely consider the peace of
the marriage before deciding whether to invoke the privilege.72
Under Trammel, witness-spouses may testify provided they do so
voluntarily. But Trammel offers a broad definition of voluntariness.
As long as the witness-spouse has actual, if not practical, alternatives
alone is all the argument that can be made to support a court-fashioned rule, it is time
for the rule's creator to destroy it.'" Id (quoting Francis v. Southern Pac., 333 U.S.
445, 471 (1948) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, however,
questioned how reason and experience could have worked such a vast change since
1958. Id. at 53. Justice Stewart also asserted that the modified rule "obliterated" the
ATP. Id. at 54.
67 Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52.
68 Id.
69 Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53.
70 Some states have opted not to follow Trammel. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Bozarth,
779 P.2d 1346, 1350 (Colo. 1989) (construing COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (1989)).
71 Id. at 52-53. However, the Trammel Court ignored the freedom of the witness-
spouse and the government to make a deal concerning cooperation outside of the court-
room under the old rule. This undercuts the argument that application of the unmodi-
fied privilege favors the defendant-spouse. Cf Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52 n.12. Further, it
is unclear whether one who has reason to fear a criminal prosecution has a right to make
a deal or that such a right outweighs the policies behind the ATP. See Richard Lempert,
A Right to Every Woman's Evidence, 27 LAw QUADRANGLE NoTEs 27(2), 31-33 (1983) (sug-
gesting that the witness-spouse who is unable to make a deal is no worse off than the
criminal foolish enough not to recruit an accomplice who can be betrayed later in ex-
change for a deal).
72 Trammel, 445 U.S. at 49 n.10 (citing I CAL. LAW REV.*COMM'N, RECOMMENDATION
AND STUDY RELATING TO THE MARITAL 'FOR AND AGAINST' TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE, at F-5
(1956)).
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to testifying, the testimony will be deemed voluntary. Thus, when
the government gives unindicted coconspirators promises of leni-
ency and grants of use immunity in return for testimony against
their spouses-as the government did in Trammel-the spouses' tes-
timony is not involuntary.
73
The reasoning of Trammel is questionable because Trammel
presumes a marriage is beyond repair simply because one spouse
wishes to testify against the other. To the contrary, the stress of a
criminal prosecution may itself cause the marital rift that leads one
spouse to testify against the other. But that does not necessarily
indicate the end of the marriage. Not all marital flare-ups end in
divorce. Trammel requires the defendant not only to maintain the
energy to put up a defense, but also to maintain a happy marriage.
Trammel's facts themselves do not present a clear example of the
type of marital disrepair that the Trammel rule addresses: did
Elizabeth Trammel testify against Otis Trammel because their mar-
riage was beyond repair, or because the government promised leni-
ency and she perhaps hoped Otis would understand and forgive
73 Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53. One might ask, however, whether testimony given to
avoid indictment can reasonably be called voluntary. If so, then very few situations,
short of testimony compelled by the court upon threat of contempt, would be involun-
tary.
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in the earlier Hawkins case foreshadowed such
problems in modifying the ATP to allow the witness-spouse to testify voluntarily:
[S]uch a rule would be difficult to administer and easy to abuse. Seldom
would it be a simple matter to determine whether the spouse's testimony
were really voluntary, since there would often be ways to compel such,
testimony more subtle than the simple issuance of a subpoena, but just as
cogent.
Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 83 (1958). It is not clear whether the Trammel rule
would find the testimony at issue in Hawkins, voluntary when the defendant's wife was
imprisoned as a material witness and later released upon a $3000 bond conditioned on
her appearance as a witness.
For a proposal arguing that an opportunity should be given to the defendant-
spouse to challenge the voluntariness of the witness-spouse's testimony, see Tom Glass-
berg, Adverse Spousal Privilege: Dead or Alive?, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 509 (1985).
One commentator uses the concept of voluntariness to support his call for the abo-
lition of the ATP altogether, claiming that, in the absence of the privilege, no marriage
would suffer the ill effects of adverse testimony since both spouses would know that the
government is to blame for compelling the testimony. See Medine, supra note 32, at 557.
The author asserts that in most cases, the defendant-spouse could not expect the
witness-spouse to face contempt charges. But, as Medine admits, this justification only
applies when the testimony will not be very damaging and the potential punishment for
the defendant will not be great. Id. at 557.
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her?74 As noted by one commentator, the Trammel rule gives the
government an incentive to break up marriages.
75
Rather than attacking the ATP directly by determining that the
public interest in truth-seeking outweighs marital protection at trial,
Trammel achieved a similar result by limiting the number of mar-
riages eligible for the ATP. However, it is far from clear that Tram-
mel successfully distinguishes between harmonious and failed
marriages. Further, even if the Trammel rule does successfully make
this distinction, the ATP does not require that courts determine
which marriages are harmonious enough to be eligible for protec-
tion. The ATP protects future harmony, regardless of the present
state of harmony. Trammel's notion that bad marriages are not
worth protecting runs contrary to the ATP's purpose and to state
domestic relations law. The ATP does not protect only those mar-
riages that are already harmonious; the ATP strives to fosterfuture
marital harmony regardless of the present state of the marriage.7 6
The Trammel Court contradicted another purpose of the ATP by
ignoring the "natural repugnance" rationale.77 When a spouse will-
ingly testifies against his or her spouse, the natural repugnance of
spouses acting adversarially is probably greater than when the court
compels the spouse to testify. Hence, the second purpose behind
the ATP argues against the Trammel modification.
Finally, Trammel contradicts domestic relations law by implying
a marriage is not worthy of ATP protection when a spouse is willing
to testify against the other spouse. Under those laws, a marriage
74 Apparently, in the case of the Trammels, the marriage was in fact in disrepair.
When questioned about the possibility of a divorce, Otis said, "I would go my way, and
[she] would go [hers]." Id. at 42 n.l. However, the record does not indicate whether
this marital discord existed prior to arrest, or whether the government's efforts to re-
cruit Elizabeth caused the dissension. The facts seem to indicate the latter, because
Elizabeth made her deal soon after her arrest; hours prior to that she had been with Otis
in Thailand apparently making heroin purchases with him. Her efforts on his behalf
prior to her arrest, although no absolute proof existed, would seem to indicate that their
marriage was in good condition.
75 Lempert, supra note 71, at 32; see also Jaymi Zwain, Evidence-Privilege Against Ad-
verse Spousal Testimony-In a Federal Criminal Proceeding Choice of Whether to Testify Against a
Defendant Spouse Belongs to Witness Spouse Alone, 55 TUL. L. REv. 961, 969 (1981) (sug-
gesting that prosecutorial pressure and marital disharmony may equally cause a witness-
spouse to decide to testify). To counter such arguments, the Trammel Court pointed out
that even under the pre-Trammel privilege, the- government could make a deal with
witness-spouses in return for nontestimonial cooperation. 445 U.S. at 52 n.12. But by
acknowledging the possibility of nontestimonial cooperation, the Court undercuts its
own argument that, under the pre-Trammel rule, a witness-spouse was unfairly denied
the opportunity to make a deal. See supra note 67.
76 See United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585, 590 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[The ATP] looks
forward with reference to the particular marriage at hand: the privilege is meant to pro-
tect against the impact of the testimony on the marriage.").
77 For discussion of the natural repugnance rationale, see supra note 22.
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plagued with disharmony still exists legally and still carries with it all
the privileges and immunities granted to married persons. By not
automatically voiding disharmonious marriages, domestic relations
law implicitly recognizes that in many situations, reconciliation is
possible.78 Trammel thus creates a split between federal marital priv-
ilege jurisprudence and state domestic relations laws.79
Trammel has had far-reaching effects. In addition to the states
that have subsequently adopted the rule by statute,80 many courts
have accepted Trammel as a mandate to further narrow the marital
privileges, using their own views to determine whether a marriage is
worthy of the marital privileges' protection.81
B. Viability Doctrine
Under the "viability doctrine,"8 2 courts have exceeded the
boundaries of state domestic relations law and have denied the mar-
ital privileges to marriages deemed nonviable or moribund, even
though still legally valid and not entered into fraudulently.83 Be-
cause legislatures would be understandably reluctant to tamper with
their own domestic relations law, the marital viability doctrine is
78 See Chan v. Bell, 464 F. Supp. 125, 130 n.12 (D.D.C. 1978).
79 This would seem to contradict Trammel's own statement: "[T]he laws of marriage
and domestic relations are concerns traditionally reserved to the states." Trammel, 445
U.S. at 50.
80 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1, Evid. Rule 505(a) (1988) (citing Trammel in the
statute's commentary); see also UNIF. R. EVID. 504 (1974) (adding an ATP in 1986 in the
form of the Trammel rule, where previously only a CCP was accommodated).
81 See, e.g., In re Witness Before Grand Jury, 791 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing
Trammel in support of its denial of both marital privileges to a marriage held moribund,
nonviable, and nonvital even though the spouses had not even entered into a legal
separation).
82 Courts do not explicitly refer to this method of adjudication as the "viability
doctrine." However, as the cases in this section show, courts use the word "viable"
frequently enough for this author to refer to the method as the "viability doctrihle."
83 See Jeffrey Jones, Federal Marital Privileges in a Criminal Context: The Need for Further
Modification Since Trammel, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 197, 220 (1986) (calling for greater
court involvement in identifying only those viable marriages worth preserving and
therefore deserving of the marital privileges).
The viability doctrine has also developed in relation to the joint participants excep-
tion, which, in some states and federal circuits, denies the ATP or the CCP to spouses
who jointly participate in crime. Although the exception primarily seeks to deny
criminals the opportunity to suppress testimony by recruiting their spouses, at least one
court has also justified the exceptions on the grounds that a marriage in which both
spouses jointly participate in crime is likely unstable and therefore undeserving of the
privileges. United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1397 (7th Cir.) (implying that a
marriage where spouses jointly participate in a crime is not a happy, positive marriage
and can therefore have no rehabilitative effect on the defendant), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1091 (1974). Other courts reject this justification for the exception, refusing to find that
a marriage between joint participants in crime is any less happy or any more likely to
disintegrate than a marriage in which the spouses do not jointly participate in crime. See
In re Grand Jury Subpoena United States, 755 F.2d 1022, 1026 (2d Cir. 1985), vacatedas
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largely a judicial creation.84 This Note asserts that courts act im-
properly when they decide that a marriage is beyond repair, even
though domestic relations law leaves that decision to the couple.
One commentator has identified two problems inherent in
court determinations of marital viability.8 5 First, courts generally
lack the expertise to determine whether a marriage has deteriorated
to the point that it does not deserve protection.8 6 Second, courts
finding a marriage not viable have failed to articulate clear standards
for viability, thus allowingjudges in later cases to rule-according to
their own prejudices-how hairmonious a marriage must be in order
to qualify for the marital privileges.
87
Prior to Trammel, courts generally recognized the problems
inherent in defining viable marriages. In United States v. Walker,88
ChiefJudge Learned Hand declared that an inquiry into whether the
marriage was "wrecked" would complicate the trial seriously, de-
spite evidence in that case that the marriage was a sham.8 9 Thus,
the court upheld the common-law rule that removed the privileges
only upon divorce or death. In a more recent case, United States v.
Lilley,90 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 'efused to condi-
tion the ATP upon a finding that the marriage was a happy one,
moot sub nom. United States v. Koecher, 475 U.S. 133 (1986) (without opinion); Appeal
of Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 1980).
For critical analysis of the joint participants exception, see Amy Bermingham, Part-
ners in Crime: The Joint Participants Exception to the Privilege Against Adverse Spousal Testimony,
53 FORDHAm L. REV. 1019 (1985) (arguing that Trammel renders the exception meaning-
less, and that the exception creates double punishment for the couple); James
McKenvin, The Joint Participants Exception to the Marital Testimonial Privilege: Balancing the
Interests "In the Light of Reason and Experience," 19 IND. L. REV. 645, 655 (1986) (noting
that the exception implies that coconspirator marriages should be dissolved since they
supposedly lack social value).
Every federal circuit addressing the issue has adopted ajoint participants exception
to the CCP, denying the privilege to communications in furtherance of criminal activity.
See United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1990) (collecting cases in each
circuit establishing the exception).
84 No state's domestic relations law acknowledges the existence of a viability stan-
dard. See Chan v. Bell, 464 F. Supp. 125, 131 (D.D.C. 1978) ("[N]ot a single jurisdiction
in the United States has ever defined marriages in terms of their stability or viability as
distinguished from their lawful creation and their dissolution by a court of law."). A
review of state domestic relations law since 1978 shows that Chan's summary of state law
is still true today.
85 Medine, supra note 32, at 532-33.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 176 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 891 (1949). For a discussion of
Walker, see Boies, supra note 58, at 907.
89 Id at 568. The defendant had married the witness and two other women to
fraudulently obtain their money.
90 581 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1978). In Lilley, the defendant's husband was permitted to
testify that the defendant had committed forgery. That ruling was held to be error,
leading to the reversal of the verdict against the defendant. Id. at 189.
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claiming that requiring such a finding would place too great a bur-
den on judicial administration. 9' In 1989, the Michigan Supreme
Court also refused to condition the CCP on a finding of viability at
the time of spousal communication.
92
Other courts, however, have ignored the concerns raised by
Walker and Lilley and have denied the marital privileges to marriages
deemed nonviable. One of the earliest cases in this line, United States
v. Fisher,93 held that the couple's marriage was ended by a previous
divorce. But the Fisher court also held that, even in the absence of a
divorce, the ATP still would not have attached, because the couple
had been separated for years, and the husband had been living with
another woman with whom he had two children. The court also
pointed to the husband's own statement that he and his wife had
little chance for reconciliation.94
In another pre-Trammel decision, United States v. Cameron,95 the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also denied the ATP to an
allegedly nonviable marriage, although the evidence of nonviability
was weaker than that in Fisher. Explicitly limiting its holding to the
facts of the case, the court ruled that the privilege would not serve
the purpose of promoting marital harmony between the Camerons.
The court was careful to note that the evidence supported a finding
that the marriage was no longer viable and that the spouses had lit-
tle hope for reconciliation: the couple had lived together for only
two weeks following their marriage, after which the husband moved
in with a former girlfriend who gave birth to his child. Finding that
as a "social fact" the marriage had expired and was moribund, the
court stated, "[The marriage was] a sordid and stormy one, and
91 Id. at 189; see also People v. Fields, 328 N.Y.S.2d 542 (N.Y. App. Div.) (granting
the ATP because of administrative difficulties involved in determining viability), aff'd,
289 N.E.2d 557 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1972). Coleman v. State, 380 A.2d 49 (Md. 1977), fol-
lowed Fields, holding that: "Absent a statutory provision to the contrary, application of
the privilege does not depend on the stability of the marriage." Id. at 49.
92 People v. Vermeulen, 438 N.W.2d 36 (Mich. 1989). For a discussion of Ver-
meulen, see William Hoey, Privilege for Confidential Spousal Communications under Section 2162
of the Revised Judicature Act of 1961 Applies Regardless of Marital Disharmony; Only Communica-
tions Made Subsequent to Final Divorce are Excluded, 67 U. D-r. L. REV. 131 (1989).
93 518 F.2d 836 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975).
94 As further proof of the marriage's deterioration, the court noted that after the
defendant was denied the privilege, defendant's counsel attempted to counter Rosalie
Fisher's testimony by saying in closing argument: "He rejected her. They have been
married for some time and now he is remarried and the father of two wonderful chil-
dren .. ." Id. at 840. However, one should question the fairness of using the defen-
dant's attack on his wife's testimony as proof that the privilege should not have been
granted when the attack was made necessary by the court's previous denial of the
privilege.
95 556 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1977).
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the couple by the time of trial were [sic] separated, probably
permanently." 96
Two years after Cameron, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, in United States v. Brown,97 disregarded the caution it had
urged in Lilley and cited the holding of Cameron to justify its own
denial of the ATP. 98 The Brown court based its denial of the privi-
lege largely on the fact that codefendant Clincy and his wife did not
see each other for eight months prior to trial.99 Despite the Fifth
Circuit's insistence that Cameron was limited to its facts and based
upon a clear evidentiary finding,1°° the Brown court focused largely
on only one of the factors listed in Cameron, and failed to reveal the
evidentiary standard applied.
Contrary to Brown's implication, courts should strive to pre-
serve marital harmony as long as reconciliation is possible. Until
reconciliation is no longer possible, the marriage continues, as do
the reasons for protecting it. Brown's most disturbing feature is its
failure to address the possibility of reconciliation. Common sense
suggests that although long separations may not bode well for a
marriage, such separations do not necessarily signal the marriage's
end or serve as evidence that reconciliation is impossible. Brown
presumed that, because the spouses were separated for eight
months, reconciliation was impossible and thus no marital harmony
to protect.
Fisher, Cameron, and Brown created a need to establish clear
evidentiary standards for determining which marriages are not via-
ble. United States v. Byrd'01 established an easily applied rule defin-
ing how long a separation must last to constitute a nonviable
marriage. The Byrd court held that spouses "permanently sepa-
rated" at the time of communication could not enjoy the benefits of
the CCP.10 2 The court justified this rule by declaring that society
has no interest in protecting confidentiality between permanently
separated spouses.103 The court also asserted that its new rule
96 Id. at 754.
97 605 F.2d 389 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). The relevant issue in
Brown was whether defendant Clincy had forged checks with his wife's signature.
98 The Brown court declared that it is difficult to visualize how protection of the
marital bond "would have required the total exclusion of Mrs. Clincy from the witness
stand." Id at 396.
99 Id
100 Cameron, 556 F.2d at 756.
101 750 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1984). In Byrd, defendant Byrd gave his wife a list of
stores (which were subsequently burned) and told her to tear it up. After his wife was
subpoenaed, he told her not to say anything about the arsons to anyone.
102 Id. at 593; accord United States v. Fulk, 816 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987).
103 750 F.2d at 593. The court continued, "The importance of the search for truth
at issue in a criminal trial outweighs the interest in protecting separated couples' confi-
dentiality." Id.
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would remove the administrative burdens of determining whether
or not a marriage had deteriorated, because establishing permanent
separation requires less intensive fact-finding than establishing
deterioration.' 04
Though the Byrd court established an easily applied rule, the
court left unanswered whether its "permanent separation" rule re-
quires a judicial order of separation under state domestic relations
law. The Byrd court never discussed legal separation and never ex-
plained what it meant by "permanent separation." A later case, In re
Witness Before the Grand Juiy,10 5 held that Byrd did not require a legal
separation.' 0 6 Thus, Byrd and its progeny created a new definition
of marital worth outside the definitions of domestic relations law.
104 Id. at 592.
105 -791 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1986). In that case the witness was called to testify regard-
ing joint checking accounts held by herself and her husband, who was a suspected nar-
cotics dealer. The couple were separated for 12 of the 23 years they had been married.
106 Id. at 238. "The Byrd court noted that permanent-and not necessarily 'legal'--
separation eliminated the availability of the privilege .. "); see also, United States v.
Jackson, 939 F.2d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1991) (denying the CCP to a couple permanently
separated "without any semblance of a marital relationship" at the time of communica-
tion); United States v. Frank, 869 F.2d 1177, 1179 (8th Cir.) (citingByrd and denying the
CCP to a couple in a "permanent separation" and "defunct marriage," without explain-
ing how the couple in question fit the definition of "permanent separation"), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 839 (1989).
Even if Byrd required legal separation, legal separation would not necessarily re-
quire denial of the marital privileges. One commentator notes that even spouses legally
separated are still legally married and may by law reconcile. See Medine, supra note 32,
at 533.
In one sense, In re Witness offers a less rigid approach than Byrd to the concept of
viability because In re Witness held that upon a finding of permanent separation the pro-
ponent may counter the privileges' denial by presenting evidence of special circum-
stances such as the possibility of reconciliation.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit formulated its viability standard differ-
ently, determining that courts may deny the ATP when a divorce action has been filed,
and extrinsic evidence, including evidence of separation and proposals for property set-
tlement, demonstrates that there is no chance of reconciliation. United States v. 1tober-
son, 859 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988). The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
recently followed Roberson in United States v. Treff, 924 F.2d 975 (10th Cir. 1991). The
court held that the CCP did not apply to a communication between Treff and his wife
which the wife recorded in her diary. Treff, accused of attempted murder with a Molo-
toy cocktail, had been separated from his wife since 1985 and was engaged to marry
another woman. Treff had also filed for divorce, and the court found no evidence of an
attempt at reconciliation. Id. at 982.
The Supreme Court of Colorado, however, refused to deny the ATP when a sepa-
rated couple had gone so far as to file papers in a divorce action, because the marriage
had not legally ended by death or dissolution. In re Marriage of Bozarth, 779 P.2d 1346,
1351 (Colo. 1989); accord Coleman v. State, 380 A.2d 49 (Md. 1977) (privilege exists
even when defendant served with divorce papers); see also Brown v. State, 401 S.E.2d
492,495 (Ga. 1991) (rejecting defendant's claim that the privilege did not apply to mori-
bund marriages since the ATP statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-23 (Michie 1988), makes
no such exception for moribund marriages); cf. In re Witness Before the Grand Jury, 791




Under Byrd, spouses separated, by court order or otherwise, for
some indeterminate amount of time cannot receive the benefits of
the marital privileges.
In re Witness expands the viability doctrine by articulating sub-
conscious and unexpressed beliefs of previous courts. According to
In re Witness, Trammel, by denying marital privilege based on a pre-
sumption about marital disrepair, invited other courts similarly to
deny the privilege based on their own presumptions of what consti-
tutes a disrupted marriage: "Trammel and Fisher demonstrate that
courts may properly inquire into whether a marriage is vital enough
to justify recognition of the adverse testimony privilege in each
case."'10 7 According to In re Witness, just as Trammel presumed the
couple's marital disrepair without proof, other courts can also make
presumptions about marital disrepair without conclusive proof.108
Under the viability doctrine, a legal marriage is no longer a pre-
requisite for a grant of the marital privileges. At its worst, the doc-
trine gives a judge complete discretion to determine marital
viability, often applying ill-defined evidentiary standards based on
subjective factors such as happiness or discord.10 9 Further, once a
trial court denies marital privilege because of marital nonviability,
the decision may only be reversed if clearly erroneous. 10 At its
best, the doctrine demands at least some proof of permanent sepa-
ration, though not necessarily legal separation, or proof that no
chance for reconciliation remains. But even at its best, the doctrine
contradicts domestic relations law, under which spouses, not judges,
initiate divorce or separation proceedings."
107 791 F.2d at 238.
108 Id at 238. The In re Witness Before Grand Juty court said, "The Carters thus pres-
ent less of a case for a 'valid marriage' than did the couple in United States v. Byrd.... "
Id This author assumes the court actually meant "viable" and could not have meant to
equate moribund marriages with invalid-i.e., nonlegal-marriages.
In another semantic step, the court also called the Carter marriage not "vital." Id.
at 247. While "viable" and "vital" have nearly the same definition, the use of the word
"vital" nonetheless gives future courts a new rhetorical device for denying marital
privileges.
109 For a discussion of a proposal allowing federal courts to use the same standards
for determining viability as used by state divorce courts, see Boies, supra note 58, at 912
n.142 (rejecting the proposal because federal courts are not familiar with such proce-
dures, and even when grounds for divorce exist, the couple might not desire a divorce).
Oddly, the Seventh Circuit has used the viability doctrine to make an unfounded
presumption of a different nature, denying the ATP to a couple married 40 years on the
grounds that their marriage was so stable that it did not need the ATP's protection.
Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 543 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820
(1978).
110 See United States v. Apodaca, 522 F.2d 568, 571 n.3 (10th Cir. 1975); Boies, supra
note 58 at 912.
S11 Some courts have recognized the dangers of allowing government agencies, such
as the Immigration and Naturalization Service, to determine the viability of a marriage
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C. Premarriage Acts Exception
The premarriage acts exception states that the ATP does not
apply to testimony concerning matters that occurred prior to the
marriage. 12 When testimony concerns such matters, a court using
the premarriage acts exception irrebuttably presumes the marriage
fraudulent. 113
The premarriage acts exception originated in the never-enacted
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 505,114 which in its proposed
list of exceptions to the ATP declared in subsection (c)(2): "There
is no privilege under this rule ... as to matters occurring prior to
the marriage .... ,,"5 The Advisory Committee Notes explain the
rationale behind the exception: "This provision eliminates the pos-
sibility of suppressing testimony by marrying the witness."' 16
United States v. Van Drunen'1 7 was the first case to apply the
premarriage acts exception. In Van Drunen, the defendant married
his unindicted co-conspirator, who was slated to be a witness against
him, one month after his indictment for illegal transportation of an
alien. The court denied the ATP on the alternate grounds that (1)
the spouses were joint participants in crime 1 8 and (2) Proposed
in the way Fisher, Cameron, and Brown authorize courts to do so. Under United States
immigration law, the spouse of a United States citizen receives automatic permanent
resident status after the petitioner has shown a valid marriage. In Chan v. Bell, 464 F.
Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1978), the government attempted to deny relative status to the peti-
tioner by calling his marriage "non-viable" which was defined by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service as having no chance of continuing. Finding that neither Congress
nor any state's domestic relations law recognizes a viability standard, the court called
viability an unworkable test that would necessitate investigations into sexual compatibil-
ity, financial security, emotional attitudes, and family relations. The words of the court
hold equally true in the marital privilege arena: "INS has no expertise in the field of
predicting the stability and growth potential of marriages if indeed anyone has-and it
surely has no business operating in that field." Id. at 130.
112 An exception to the CCP for communications prior to marriage would be unnec-
essary, since by definition that privilege only applies to communications during mar-
riage. See Garcia-Jaramillo v. INS, 604 F.2d 1236 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
828, reh g denied, 449 U.S. 1026 (1980); United States v. Pensinger, 549 F.2d 1150 (8th
Cir. 1977); Volianitis v. INS, 352 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1965); Damino v. Board of Regents,
508 N.Y.S.2d 618 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (denying the CCP to acts prior to marriage
when New York only had a communications privilege); State v. Pratt, 53 N.W.2d 18
(Wis. 1967) (denying defendant's claim to the ATP as to acts prior to marriage, when
Wisconsin only had a communications privilege).
113 The exception levies double punishment, because it not only denies a noncollu-
sive marriage the protections of the ATP, but also labels the marriage a sham and thus
voidable. See supra part II.C. (discussing the sham marriages exception).
114 51 F.R.D. 315, 369 (1971).
115 Id.
116 Id. at 371.
117 501 F.2d 1393 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1091 (1974).
118 Id. at 1396. Under the joint participants exception to the ATP,joint participants.
in crime cannot avail themselves of that privilege. See supra note 83. According to Van
Drunen, two rationales justify the exception: (1) it serves as a disincentive to criminals to
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Federal Rule of Evidence 505(c) (2) prevents testimony as to matters
prior to marriage." 9 Although the court acknowledged that Rule
505(c)(2) was only a proposal, the court gave no further explanation
for its reliance on a nonstatutory pronouncement, other than recit-
ing the Advisory Committee's note. Oddly, the court did not dis-
cuss that, on the facts, the marriage did indeed appear
fraudulent.' 20 Rather than reach such a finding, the court took the
easier, less burdensome route offered by the per se proposed Rule
505(c)(2).
Two years after Van Drunen, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Tennessee, in United States v. Owens,' 2' re-
fused to follow Van Drunen.'22 The Owens court reasoned that Van
Drunen had created the premarriage acts exception based on the
faulty assumption that Proposed Rule 505 would become law. The
Owens court stated: "The reasonfor the [ATP] is too pervasive for
the creation of exceptions in such an 'off-handed manner.' "123
Owens also criticized Proposed Rule 505(c)(2) as an "abortive effort"
to combine the ATP with the CCP.
124
Despite congressional rejection of Proposed Rule 505(c) and
the Owens court's questioning of the reasoning in Van Drunen, the
Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Clark,' 25 continued to assert that
its premarriage acts exception was a necessary modification to the
ATP. Stating that the exception primarily addresses the problem of
collusive marriages, 26 Clark explained that the exception does not
recruit their spouses as accomplices; and (2) in cases when spouses jointly participate in
crime, one of the rationales for the privilege-its rehabilitative effect on marriage-is
irrelevant. The first rationale makes little sense after Trammel, because criminals can no
longer be certain that their spouses will not testify. The second rationale fails for two
separate reasons: First, the rehabilitative effect of marriage has never been offered as a
justification for the privilege. Second, the rationale erroneously implies that criminal
marriages are unworthy of rehabilitation.
119 501 F.2d at 1397.
120 Defendant Van Drunen married his wife-the alien in question--one month after
his indictment.
121 424 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). In the case, defendant's husband was called
to testify that defendant, prior to becoming his wife, had cashed a forged check which he
later paid back.
122 Id. at 422.
123 Id. at 423.
124 Id. at 422. Although the Owens court did not explain what it meant by this state-
ment, apparently the court was referring to the fact that the ATP concerns acts and
communications made prior to and during marriage, while the CCP concerns only com-
munications made during marriage. By limiting the ATP to acts and communications
during marriage only, the two privileges become less distinct.
125 712 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1983). Clark and his wife were convicted of embezzling
money from a savings and loan where she worked before they married.
The Court asserted that the rejection of Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence
505(c)(2) "did not signal the rejection of the premarriage acts exception." Id. at 302.
126 Id. at 302.
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require an actual finding of collusion. The Clark court argued that
the exception allows courts to avoid mini-trials on the sincerity of
the parties in getting married and is consistent with the general pol-
icy of limiting privileges in light of reason and experience.' 27 This
explanation dearly established that the presumption of a collusive
marriage is irrebuttable.
Clark's rationale for the premarriage acts exception-to deter
the formation of collusive marriages entered into solely to suppress
testimony' 2 8-is fundamentally flawed. After Trammel, a criminal
defendant can no longer demand suppression of a witness's testi-
mony after marrying that witness, because only the witness-spouse
can raise the privilege. Although the defendant-spouse may succeed
in persuading the witness-spouse not to testify, after Trammel the de-
fendant-spouse cannot legally compel that result. Clark, decided
post-Trammel, ignored this logical inconsistency.
The Clark court's flawed reasoning allowed it to create an
exception to the ATP that conflicts with the ATP in several ways. At
the most basic level, Clark's formulation of the premarriage acts ex-
ception flatly contradicts the rationale supporting the ATP-pro-
tecting the marriage at the time of trial regardless of the testimony's
subject matter.' 29 Further, by presuming collusion in marriages
formed after testimonial acts, the exception violates the general rule
that, following proof from the proponent that a legal marriage
exists, the challenger to an assertion of the ATP must provide proof
that the marriage is collusive.' 3 0 Under the premarriage acts excep-
tion, the challenger meets the burden of proof through an irrebut-
table presumption. As a result, many noncollusive marriages could
be labelled collusive without an opportunity to rebut that presump-
tion. The Supreme Court, in Vlandis v. Kline,'3' held that the law
127 Id. Clark's appeal to promote judicial administrability and avoid "mini-trials"
through application of the privilege does not offer a convincing rationale for the'excep-
tion. Sham marriages are not common enough to make the occasional mini-trial a great
burden. The burden is no greater than that involved in proving the existence of a con-
spiracy in order to apply the co-conspirator hearsay exception, which requires an evi-
dentiary hearing.
To be consistent with domestic relations law, the hearing itself should follow do-
mestic relations rules for proving fraudulent marriages to the extent possible.
128 As support for its argument, Clark asserts that no court has ever rejected the
exception, apparently overlooking Owens. Id. More importantly, Clark fails to mention
that, except for the Seventh Circuit and the Eastern District of Tennessee, no court had
ever entertained the notion.
129 See Medine, supra note 32, at 530 ("[The exception is] inconsistent with protect-
ing the ongoing marital relationship .... ).
130 See supra part II.C. (discussing the sham-marriage exception).
131 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973) (invalidating a Connecticut statute that irrebuttably
presumed nonresidency for those applying from out of state for in-state college tuition);
see also Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114, 1124-26 (2d Cir. 1976) (invalidating a
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disfavors irrebuttable presumptions that are not universally true in
fact, because they deny due process to those who could disprove the
presumption.' 3 2 Under the reasoning of Vlandis, the premarriage
acts exception violates due process because it is not universally true
in fact and denies those falling within its reach the opportunity to
prove that their marriage is not a sham.
Two recent federal cases, one in the Eastern District of Michi-
gan' 33 and one in the Ninth Circuit,134 show the potential unfairness
of the premarriage acts exception. Both cases concern nonsham
marriages that would have been denied the AT? had those jurisdic-
tions recognized the premarriage acts exception. 13 5 In each case,
the exception would have denied the AT? to legal, noncollusive, vi-
able marriages and thus would have disrupted marital harmony, di-
rectly contradicting the privilege's purpose.
The first opportunity to examine Clark and extend the premar-
riage acts exception beyond the Seventh Circuit came in In re Grand
Jury Proceedings.'36 In In re Grand Jury Proceedings, the timing of the
witness's marriage to the defendant was highly suspicious on its
face, because the couple married eight days after the witness's first
grand jury testimony and four days before her scheduled second
grand jury testimony. However, the court rejected Clark's premar-
riage acts exception and refused to find that the marriage was a
sham.' 3 7 Citing Trammel as support for the continued vitality of the
ATP, the court held that when no proof of a sham marriage can be
offered, the premarriage acts exception would render the privilege
meaningless and cannot be squared with the policy behind the privi-
federal statute that irrebuttably presumed pregnant member of the U.S. Marine Corps
unfit for duty).
132 Unlike the premarriage acts exception, the marital privileges are not per se rules.
Although they seem to presume that testimony will either destroy the marriage (for the
ATP) or that the spouses will be deterred from communicating (for the CCP), these are
presumptions central to a determination of policy; they are not presumptions designed
to adjudicate a disputed set of facts.
133 In re GrandJury Proceedings, 640 F.Supp 988 (E.D. Mich. 1986). See discussion
infra note 136 and accompanying text.
134 In re GrandJury Proceedings (Emo), 777 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1985) (consolidated
cases). Emo received a grand jury subpoena to testify regarding Schultz, his live-in com-
panion of two years. They married one month later, just five days before his grand jury
appearance. The prosecution claimed the marriage was a sham, even though the gov-
ernment conceded that the couple married as a natural progression of their love and
affection for each other and that they intended to live together as husband and wife.
135 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 640 F. Supp. 988, explicitly rejected the exception
pointing out that its application would have led to an erroneous finding of fraud. Id at
991-92. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Emo), 777 F.2d 508, did not discuss the excep-
tion nor adopt it.
136 640 F.Supp. 988 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
137 Id at 992.
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lege.138 Echoing the Owens opinion, the court also declared that it
could find no basis for such a broad-based exception. 3 9
On the federal level, no circuit other than the Seventh Circuit
has adopted the premarriage acts exception. However, on the state
level, where statute largely determines the rules of testimonial privi-
lege, the premarriage acts exception has enjoyed greater success.
Eight states currently have some type of premarriage acts excep-
tion,1 40 with a ninth state awaiting adoption of the exception by its
supreme court.14 ' Almost all of these statutes were enacted after
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Clark. Relatively few cases have ap-
plied these statutes, but two cases in particular suggest state courts
will view such statutes approvingly. In Osborne v. State,' 42 a case in-
volving testimony relating to acts prior to marriage, the Alaska
Supreme Court denied the ATP based on its finding of a sham mar-
riage. However, the court did not base its finding of a sham mar-
riage on actual proof of fraud, but instead relied on the inference of
fraud from the circumstances of an "eve-of-trial" wedding.'
43
Rather, the court stated that, had the state's premarriage acts excep-
tion been in force at the time of the events in question, it would
138 Id. In rejecting the government's alternate claim that the marriage was in fact a
sham, the court noted that the couple had made their marriage plans two years earlier
and had chosen the actual wedding date solely because it was the only day the local
magistrate could perform the ceremony. The court added that there was no evidence
indicating that the couple did not plan to cohabitate after marriage. Id. at 990-91.
. In one commentator's view, however, the facts of the case indicate that the privilege
was unnecessary for the couple, since marital harmony was obviously not sufficiently
disturbed to prevent the marriage from taking place eight days later. See Medine, supra
note 32, at 558. One has to wonder how Professor Medine knows whether marital har-
mony was disturbed or not. His comment parallels the approach this Note argues
against, i.e., determining whether a marriage deserves the privilege based on presump-
tions about the state of the marriage when few facts support the presumption.
139 640 F. Supp. at 992.
140 See ALAsKA R. EVID. 505(a)(2)(D)(iv) (1991) (covering crimes prior to marriage);
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062(1) (1989) (creating exception by exclusion, by grant-
ing the ATP only to events during marriage); CAL. EvI. CODE § 972(f) (West 1966 and
1990 Supp.) (only applies where witness-spouse acquired knowledge of the.act before
marriage and was aware that defendant-spouse had been arrested or charged with a
crime); CoLo. REV. STAr. § 13-90-107(l)(a)(I) (1987) (covers only crimes prior to mar-
riage); HAw. REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rule 505(c)(2) (1988) (adopting modified version of
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 505); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(1)(a) (West 1988)
(covers only homicide or attempted homicide prosecutions when the crime occurred
prior to marriage); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.295(3) (Michie 1986); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 40.255(4)(b) (1988).
141 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 422A.0504 (Baldwin 1990) (effective July 1, 1992) (appli-
cable to criminal proceedings).
142 623 P.2d 784 (Alaska 1981).
143 Id. at 787. The couple was married in the courthouse fifteen minutes prior to a
hearing, at the urging of defendant's lawyer.
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have applied that exception, making a finding of fraud
unnecessary.' 44
In State v. Williams,145 the Arizona Supreme Court addressed
whether the trial court below erred in admitting statements made by
the defendant-spouse to the witness-spouse prior to their marriage.
Because Arizona's ATP statute had no premarriage acts exception at
the time, the court concluded that it had no choice but to hold that
the trial court improperly denied the privilege.1 46 Although the
court was unable to say positively that the marriage was a sham, the
court indicated that the spouses likely entered into the marriage to
suppress testimony. The Williams court, reasoning similarly to the
Clark court, criticized Arizona's marital privilege statute as encour-
aging marriages entered into to suppress testimony.1 47 Two years
later, the Arizona state legislature accepted the court's invitation to
change the statute by adding a premarriage acts exception. 148
Hence, the state courts and legislatures, unlike federal courts, -seem
more receptive to the premarriage acts exception.
CONCLUSION
Although the marital privileges evolved from legal fictions,
their inauspicious beginnings should not detract from, nor be rele-
vant to, their present justifications. As long as the privileges have
legal validity, courts and legislatures implementing the privileges
should respect them.
Given the existence of the marital privileges in federal courts
and in most states, courts and legislatures should apply the privi-
leges in a manner consistent with their purposes and with state do-
mestic relations law. The privileges undeniably address the
interests of the marital unit. Courts and legislatures must therefore
ensure that the privileges apply only to those persons legally mar-
ried under state domestic relations law, which, under Pennoyer, de-
termines the definition of marriage.
1 49
144 Id.
145 650 P.2d 1202 (Ariz. 1982).
146 Id. at 1213.
147 Id. at 1214. The Williams dissent took a more rigorous stance in favor of a
premarriage acts exception. Desiring a reduction in administrative burdensJudge Cam-
eron argued that when testimony concerns illegal acts prior to marriage, the courts
should not have to define the motives behind the marriage. In contrast to the majority,
Judge Cameron believed that the courts need not wait for the legislature to create a
premarriage acts exception, basing his belief on a legislative intent to have a pre-
marriage acts exception implied into the ATP statute. Id. at 1216 (Cameron,J., dissent-
ing). He cited no legislative history for his argument.
148 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062(1) (1989).
149 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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Thus divorced persons, deceased persons, engaged persons,
persons not meeting the requirements of common-law marriage,
putative spouses, unmarried cohabitants, and persons who married
fraudulently should not benefit from the marital privileges, because
such persons do not meet the requirements of legal marriage under
state domestic relations law. But when the legal existence of a mar-
riage is established under state domestic relations laws, courts and
legislatures should not deny the marital privileges based upon a
determination that the marriage is unworthy of the privileges'
protections.
Respecting privileges does not require faith in the policies be-
hind the privileges. Rather, respecting the privileges means apply-
ing them as defined and respecting state domestic relations law.
The Trammel doctrine, the viability doctrine, and the premarriage
acts exception show disrespect for both the purposes of the privi-
leges and for state prerogatives in domestic relations law. The re-
sult is uninformed decision-making and contradictory definitions of
marriage.
Steven N. Gofmant
t The author wishes to thank Herbert,Judith, and Sheryl Gofman-an outstanding
example of a family worth protecting-for their love and support.
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